The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation: International Evidence by Art A. Durnev & Amrita S. Nain






ART A. DURNEV AND
AMRITA S. NAIN*
T
here is a long standing debate in the finance and
law literatures about the need for insider trading
regulation. Some scholars and practitioners argue
that insider trading restrictions should be revoked
because insider trading allows private information to
be quickly incorporated into stock prices, thereby
leading to more informationally efficient stock prices
(Carlton and Fischel (1983); Dye (1984)). For exam-
ple, Milton Friedman, laureate of the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economics, said:“You want more
insider trading, not less.You want to give the people
most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of
the company an incentive to make the public aware
of that” (CNN interview, January 17, 2002).
In contrast, proponents of insider trading regulation
assert that insider trading discourages investment
and damages corporate value
because uninformed investors
face an adverse selection prob-
lem (Manove (1989); Ausubel
(1990); Fischer (1992)).An unin-
formed but savvy investor knows
that in the presence of insider
trading she is likely to be a buyer
when stock is overvalued and a
seller when it is undervalued. In
anticipation of losses, she may
choose not to trade that stock.
Thus, it is argued that allowing insiders to trade at
the expense of uninformed outsiders diminishes
investor confidence and hurts the integrity of capital
markets (Brudney (1979); Easterbrook (1985);
Glosten (1989); Maug (1995, 2002)).
Insider trading restrictions have been introduced in
most markets in the last decade, and in many, the
restrictions have also been enforced with the prose-
cution of those violating the rules. A survey by
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) finds that out of
103 countries that have stock markets,87 have intro-
duced insider trading rules.A principal goal of intro-
ducing insider trading restrictions appears to be to
prevent informationally advantaged insiders from
trading at the expense of the uninformed public.The
objective of our paper is to examine whether insider
trading regulation deters trading by individuals with
private information.
Figure 1 displays an index of insider trading regula-
tion created by Beny (2005, 2006) for 33 countries.
She constructs this de jure index of insider trading
regulation by aggregating individual components of
countries’ insider trading laws. The index is formed
by adding one if (1) violation of the insider trading
law is a criminal offense; (2) individuals who receive
information from insiders are prohibited from trad-















































































































































































































































































Source: Beny (2005, 2006).
INSIDER TRADING LAWS INDEX
Longer bars indicate stricter laws against insider trading.
Figure 1
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are prohibited from tipping outsiders about material
nonpublic information and/or encouraging them to
trade on such information for personal gain; (4)
monetary penalties are proportional to insiders’
trading profits; (5) investors have a private right of
action. Figure 1 shows that Mexico, Norway, and
Russia have relatively lax insider trading laws scor-
ing 1 out of 5, while Canada, Ireland, and South
Korea, the United States have strict laws scoring 5.
Do laws against insider trading deter private infor-
mation trading?
Trading by insiders or individuals with non-public
information is not directly observable. Therefore, to
study the effectiveness of insider trading laws, we
need a proxy for private information trading. In our
paper,it is measured as the serial correlation in stock
returns. Llorente et. al (2002) argue that the correla-
tion over time reflects the degree of private infor-
mation trading in that stock. When a subset of
investors sells a stock for hedging reasons,the stock’s
price must decrease to attract other investors to buy.
Since the expectation of future stock payoff remains
the same, the decrease in the price causes a low
return in the current period and a high expected
return for the next period. When a subset of
investors sells a stock using private information, the
stock price decreases, reflecting the negative private
information about its future payoff. Since this infor-
mation is usually partially impounded into the price,
the low return in the current period is followed by a
low return in the next period, when the negative pri-
vate information is further reflected in price. In
short, hedging trades generate negatively correlated
returns,and private information trades generate pos-
itively correlated returns.
Using this measure of private information trading,
we examine the effectiveness of insider trading reg-
ulation in a sample of 2,189 firms from 21 countries.
Figure 2 indicates a monotonically negative relation
between the strictness of laws against insider trading
and the aggregate amount of private information
trading.
The results of this cross-country comparison are
reinforced when we compare private information
trading in a country before the first enforcement of
insider trading restrictions with private information
trading in the same country after the first enforce-
ment of insider trading restrictions. As in
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002),the time of the first
enforcement is the year in which the country first
enforced its insider trading laws by prosecuting a
violator. We find that, on aver-
age, the amount of private infor-
mation trading decreases signifi-
cantly after the first enforcement
of insider trading laws (Table 1).
Problems with poor-governance
firms
Although insider trading restric-
tions are, on average, associated
with lower private information
trading, we expect to see varia-
tion in this relationship depend-
ing on the quality of firm corpo-
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Figure 2
Table 1 
Decrease in private information trading after the 








ing before enforcement 0.00674
Private information 
trading after enforcement –0.0315
Difference (after – before) –0.0383 12.080
Note: Private information trading after the first en-
forcement is smaller than before enforcement. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors.CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 12
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governance quality on company level by the owner-
ship wedge – the difference between control and
cash flow rights of large shareholders. Large share-
holders and managers who have high levels of con-
trol but lack sufficient cash flow rights are known to
seek private benefits which are not shared with
minority shareholders (Claessens et al. (2002);
Faccio and Lang (2002)). Control rights can exceed
cash flow rights because of pyramidal structure,
cross-holdings, and dual-class shares. For example, if
the controlling shareholder owns ten percent of
company A’s outstanding stocks, which in turn owns
30 percent of firm B’s stocks, then she is considered
to control ten percent of firm B, the weakest link in
the chain of control rights. However, the cash flow
rights of firm B owned by the controlling sharehold-
er is only three percent (10%*30%).
There are several reasons why insider trading laws
may be less effective in restraining insiders from trad-
ing on private information when governance problems
are large, that is, when the ownership wedge is high.
First, when the ownership wedge is high, controlling
shareholders are more likely to engage in insider
trading to make up for their scarce cash flow rights.
They are also less likely to relinquish trading profits
if insider trading restrictions are imposed because
the lack of sound governance provides more oppor-
tunities to mask insider trades through the use of off-
shore accounts, nominee accounts, independent
manager-owned companies etc.
Second, insider trading is one of several avenues for
expropriating profits from outside investors.
Restricting insider trading without closing other
channels of expropriation may encourage control-
ling shareholders and managers of companies with
poor governance to seek other methods of diverting
resources away from minority shareholders. Other
methods include elaborate transfer pricing schemes,
special dividends, perquisites consumption and out-
right stealing. If controlling shareholders are
engaged in expropriation,they are likely to mask the
resulting poor performance of the firm through, for
example, earnings management. The resulting
opaque environment can increase the returns to pri-
vate information acquisition and trading.
We test the validity of these arguments by address-
ing the following empirical question -how effective
are insider trading laws in reducing private informa-
tion trading for firms and countries with governance
problems?
Table 2 provides country summary statistics (country
averages) of the ownership wedge, which is our
proxy for governance problems, along with statistics
for other relevant variables such as private informa-
tion trading, control rights, cash flow rights, de jure











De jure index 
of insider
trading laws
Year of first en-
forcement of insider 
trading laws
Austria 0.0379 54.454 47.457 6.997 2 No cases
Belgium 0.0416 37.621 32.335 5.286 3 1994
Finland 0.0426 32.643 28.820 3.824 3 1993
France 0.0253 46.290 45.309 0.981 4 1975
Germany 0.0268 46.976 41.202 5.774 3 1995
Hong Kong –0.000181 33.150 28.920 4.230 3 1994
Indonesia 0.0610 34.773 25.045 9.727 2 1996
Italy 0.0699 51.991 44.177 7.814 3 1996
Japan 0.0254 11.085 7.250 3.835 2 1990
Malaysia 0.00629 33.646 28.738 4.908 3 1996
Norway 0.0781 25.434 23.226 2.208 1 1990
Philippines 0.0891 28.000 24.857 3.143 2 No cases
Portugal 0.0696 43.633 40.405 3.228 4 No cases
Singapore 0.0411 29.515 22.412 7.103 4 1978
South Korea –0.0246 22.893 19.848 3.045 5 1988
Spain 0.0554 28.591 26.654 1.937 4 1998
Sweden 0.0603 26.047 19.006 7.041 3 1990
Switzerland 0.0348 40.028 27.639 12.389 3 1995
Taiwan 0.00429 22.705 18.672 4.033 4 1989
Thailand 0.0658 37.931 33.985 3.946 3 1993
UK 0.00119 16.893 15.654 1.239 3 1981
Source: Authors.CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 13
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insider trading laws,and years of first enforcement of
the laws. . There is great variation in the average
amount of private information trading.It is the high-
est in Philippines (0.089), Norway (0.078), and Italy
(0.069) and the lowest in South Korea (– 0.025),
Hong Kong (0.000), and the U.K (0.001).
Table 3 presents the results of regressions of private
information trading on ownership wedge and strict-
ness of insider trading laws. The positive coefficient
on the ownership wedge indicates that firms with
more governance problems (higher ownership
wedge) experience more private information trad-
ing. This finding seems consistent with the notion
that controlling shareholders of firms with higher
governance problems are more likely to use sensitive
private information to obtain trading profits for
themselves.The negative coefficient on insider trad-
ing laws suggests that stricter insider trading laws are
associated with less private information trading (as
already seen in Figure II).
However, the positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction of ownership wedge with insider
trading regulation indicates that insider trading reg-
ulation is less effective in reducing private informa-
tion trading when the wedge between ownership and
control is higher,that is,when firm governance prob-
lems are worse.
The sizes of the coefficients in Table 3 also indicate
that the effect of stricter insider trading laws are not
only statistically but also economically significant.
When insider trading laws index improves by one
point (out of five), the amount of private informa-
tion trading decreases by 13% relative to the sample
average. Judging from the coefficient on the interac-
tion term of ownership wedge with insider trading
laws, for firms with the highest governance (zero
ownership wedge), private information trading
decreases by 18% relative to the sample average.For
firms with the lowest governance (60% ownership
wedge) it actually increases by 2.0%. This confirms
our argument that although stricter insider trading
regulation reduces private information trading, the
laws become less effective for companies with worse
governance.
We argued above that this asymmetric relation
between private information trading and insider
trading restrictions arises partly because managers
banned from trading are likely to make up for lost
profits by expropriating the firm’s resources,particu-
larly when firm governance is poor. Managers who
divert firms’ resources will attempt to mask the
resulting poor performance of the firm, foster infor-
mation asymmetry and thus, increase the returns to
private information trading. This argument is sup-
ported by the data.Table 3 also shows a regression of
earnings opacity, which measures the quality of
information disclosed by the firm to the public, on
the ownership wedge and insider trading laws. We
find that firms with high ownership wedge have
more opaque earnings. Moreover, a high ownership
wedge is associated with even greater opacity in
countries with stricter insider trading laws.Thus, the
quality of information provided to the public
becomes lower when strict insider trading restric-
tions are imposed on firms with poorer governance.
Problems with weak investor protection
When controlling shareholders with inadequate cash
flow rights can resort to alternative forms of expro-
priation, insider trading restrictions may lead to
more private information trading and higher earn-
ings opacity. However, in countries where investor
rights are well protected, it is costlier for controlling
shareholders who have been deprived of insider
trading profits to resort to other means of expropri-
ation. Therefore, one is less likely to observe earn-
ings opacity and private information trading when
insider trading restrictions and good investor protec-
tion co-exist.
In Table 4,we repeat our analyses for sub-samples of
low- and high-investor protection countries.We find
Table 3 
Impact of insider trading laws and firm governance on







Ownership wedge 0.0206 0.209
Insider trading laws –0.0117 –0.0115
Interaction of owner-
ship wedge with insider 
trading laws
0.0142 0.0138
Number of firms 2,059 1,706
Note: All indicated coefficients are significant at
10% level. Every regression controls for firm cash
flow rights, liquidity, market capitalization, invest-
ment opportunities, research and development ex-
penditures, and industry fixed effects.
 Source: Authors.CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 14
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that in the high-investor protection sub-sample,
insider trading restrictions are unambiguously asso-
ciated with lower private information trading and
earnings opacity. However, in countries with poor
investor protection, the combination of strict insider
trading restrictions and poor firm governance could
lead to higher private information trading and high-
er earnings opacity. That is, the adverse effects of
combining strict insider trading restrictions with
poor firm governance are observed only in countries
where minority shareholder rights are poorly pro-
tected.
What can emerging economies do to prevent
insider trading?
In the past decade, most stock markets around the
world have introduced rules against insider trading.
In many countries, these rules have been enforced
with the prosecution of violators. The objective of
insider trading restrictions is purportedly to improve
the integrity and liquidity of stock markets by
encouraging ordinary investors to participate.
We examine the effectiveness of insider trading
restrictions in reducing private information trading.
Our results indicate that insider trading restrictions
become less effective if firm governance standards
are weak or investors are not well protected.
Controlling shareholders and managers banned
from insider trading may be able to make up for the
loss in trading profits by covertly expropriating firm
resources if the protection given to minority share-
holders is low. Thus, imposing
insider trading restrictions on
firms with governance problems
or in countries where investors
are not protected sufficiently
may actually increase private
information trading since the
returns to information acquisi-
tion are likely to be high in the
resulting opaque environment.
If the primary objective of insid-
er trading restrictions is to
encourage the uninformed pub-
lic to participate in the market,
then regulators, especially in
emerging economies, need to be
wary of the effect insider trading
restrictions have on the aggre-
gate level of private information trading. For firms
and countries with governance problems, the restric-
tions may not make uninformed investors better-off,
unless the regulator ensures a concomitant improve-
ment in investor protection standards.Countries that
do not protect minority shareholders adequately but
have strict laws against insider trading should ensure
stronger investor protection standards that would
make expropriation and manipulation of financial
statements harder. Otherwise, the costs of introduc-
ing and enforcing insider trading restrictions may
not be worthwhile.
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